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National Oil Companies and the Dual Mandate
A BALANCE BETWEEN PROFITABILITY AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
JENNIFER ERNST ROBINSON
University of Denver
M.A. Candidate, Global Finance, Trade and Economic Integration

National Oil Companies (NOCs) collectively own approximately 90 percent of the
world’s oil reserves, with the Middle East and North Africa region accounting for about
67 percent. Yet the nature of their state ownership endows NOCs with a dual mandate: to
profitably extract the country’s oil reserves while also promoting economic and social
development for the domestic population. This paper focuses on how the dual mandate
affects the management, operations, investment and efficiency of NOCs. I argue that the
prevailing culture and norms of Middle Eastern NOCs – embodied in their dual missions
of profitability and social development – are an entrenched component of their identity
and will continue to be a major driver of management and investment decisions. This
reality presents substantial challenges for governments and their NOCs in the current era
of depressed oil prices and global recession. Thus, I conclude by exploring how
circumstances in both the global economy and domestic political economy of oil
exporters will affect the extent to which Middle Eastern NOCs can evolve to meet new
challenges.

The political economy of resource-rich states faces an inherent tension between the
role of the state and the private sector over control of the rents produced by the sale of the
natural resources. Perhaps no extractive industry has been more volatile than oil, the
main energy source of modern industrialization. The industry is characterized by
continuous cycles of spikes in demand, which precipitate an influx of actors, oversupply
of oil, and eventual price collapse; the low prices discourage investment, leading to a
supply shortage and again excess demand. Oil market actors – whether it is monopoly
companies or cartels of countries – attempt to influence these cycles and shift the burden
of price adjustment onto consumers, thereby maintaining their profit levels.
As the supply of oil grew in the pre- and post- World War II eras, vast reserves were
found in developing countries and former colonies, which gave rise to an important
dilemma over the ownership of the oil in the ground: Whom should own, and in turn,
benefit, from the sale of the commodity – the entire population of the nation-state
underneath which the reserves lie, or private enterprise and capitalists with the ability and
skill to develop an oil sector for the domestic economy? As many former colonies gained
independence in the period of the 1950s through the 1970s, and struggled to escape
poverty, the governments chose the former option, and states took control of private,
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international oil companies operating in the country. Thus, the National Oil Company
(NOC) was born with a dual mission to develop the country’s oil reserves while also
promoting economic and social development. This public ownership of capital gave
these companies special status as monopoly actor in the country’s hydrocarbon sector. In
exchange, they were obliged to supply cheap energy to the domestic market and support
economic growth through an array of local content obligations and government-mandated
employment targets.
Methodology
This paper focuses on how the dual mandate affects the management, operations,
investment, and efficiency of Middle Eastern NOCs. I argue that the prevailing culture
and norms of the NOCs – embodied in their dual missions of profitability and social
development – are an entrenched component of their identity that will continue to be a
major driver of management and investment decisions. This reality presents substantial
challenges for such governments and their NOCs in the current era of depressed oil prices
and global recession. Thus, I conclude by exploring how circumstances in both the
global economy and domestic political economy of oil exporters will affect the extent to
which NOCs can evolve to meet new challenges.
The dominance of NOCs in world oil markets cannot be underestimated: They
collectively own approximately 90 percent of the world’s oil reserves, with the Middle
East and North Africa accounting for 67.1 percent (Marcel 2005; BP 2006). With respect
to the demand for energy, the Middle East and North Africa accounted for 40 percent of
global oil exports in 2005 (BP 2006). Because of the strategic importance of this
geographical region, this paper focuses on the NOCs of the Middle East and North Africa
that dominate global oil supply.
This paper’s methodology relies in part on qualitative interview research gleaned
from case studies of these NOCs. The research and analysis will shed light on the
corporate culture and management attitudes – factors play an important role in decisionmaking at an NOC where shareholder profits are not the sole objective of management.
An inherent criticism of this method is the subjective nature of the information provided
by interviewees and its susceptibility to personal biases. However, such research on
management attitudes does not lend well to statistical testing. Moreover, the highly
secretive nature of these companies leaves a dearth of publicly available information in
some research areas. As such, this analysis will combine the qualitative research with
quantitative data from large, cross-country studies in order to gain insight on NOC
efficiency. By doing so, this paper will evaluate how the corporate norms of NOCs affect
the execution of the dual mandate, and then assess critically these norms in light of
current economic and political challenges.
The paper consists of five sections. The next section will review the literature on
NOCs, detailing their evolution and the transition from private ownership. The third
section will examine the drivers of NOC operations and performance, presenting
empirical evidence on NOCs and their efficiencies and inefficiencies. The fourth section
will look at opportunities and challenges for NOCs and the implications for world oil
markets. The fifth section concludes.
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Literature Review: The Evolution of Middle Eastern NOCs
Because developing countries hold the largest untapped reserves, their domestic
economic, political, and social challenges have a direct impact on the ability of the NOCs
to bring the reserves to market, and therefore, on the long-term price stability of the
global energy supply. It is crucial, however, to first understand the history of oil
development in these countries in order to understand why Middle Eastern NOCs
emerged, and in turn, how this history influences their current management.
There were two primary forces driving oil exploration in the Middle East and Asia in
the early 1900s. The first driver was the international oil companies (IOCs) and their
quest to control and integrate upstream and downstream assets to prevent overproduction
and thereby stabilize the price (Yergin 1992). Second, the great powers of the period
were focused on carving out spheres of influence across the globe. Thus, geopolitical
concerns drove Great Britain to explore oil wells in Persia, in order to counter an
expanding Russian empire and provide the Royal Navy with a secure energy supply
(Yergin 1992). During this time many governments signed concession agreements with
IOCs because the companies had advanced technology and expertise to explore for and
extract oil. IOCs assumed the large up-front costs in exchange for a percentage of profits
over a specific period, while paying royalties to the government.
However, this arrangement was complicated by what Raymond Vernon theorized as
the ‘obsolescing bargain’ of the state. He postulates that as the terms of risk change with
the progression of a project, governments have less incentive to honor the generous
concessions promised to the IOCs (Vernon 1971). In fact, governments frequently did
use their sovereign power to renegotiate terms in attempt to capture greater tax revenue
(Kemp 1992).
Eventually, however, there was little incentive to rely on contracts with IOCs at all.
Governments perceived they could reap greater resource rents and gain more
technological know-how by creating state-owned companies to replace the IOCs.
Moreover, there was widespread belief that IOCs – viewed by governments as extensions
of the colonial powers from which they sought full liberation – were merely exploiting
the natural endowments of the country and providing little benefit to the people or
economy (Madelin 1974). In fact, the oil majors’ operations in host countries were
largely staffed with American expatriates and provided little to no benefit for domestic
employment (Stevens 2008). NOCs were therefore perceived as a means to spur capital
accumulation and broader economic and social development in the economy (Noreng
1997; Auty 1990). And the ideological roots of nationalization also became a source of
national pride (Stevens 2008); the action represented an assertion of state sovereignty
over the most valuable sector of the economy.
Another driver of the transition to national ownership was the problem of
information asymmetries within the imperfect competition of oil markets. Because IOCs
were virtually isolated from the rest of the economy and generated few knowledge
spillovers, the government had little information with which it could assert control over
IOCs or evaluate the appropriateness of the fiscal concessions and management of
reserves and extraction (Van der Linde 2000; Marcel 2005). With the terms of most oil
concessions lasting eighty years or more, this lack of control over such a big sector of the
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economy significantly restricted the policy autonomy of sovereign states over the
economic actors within their borders.
Another policy dispute stemmed from the national governments’ push for higher
production levels, for which they encountered steady resistance on the part of the oil
majors (Sampson 1975). The incentives of IOCs and national governments were not
aligned, and therefore, their respective goals for the industry diverged. The IOCs in the
1960s were concerned with stability of price, and in turn, the prevention of oversupply;
whereas national governments sought higher revenues to increase the resource rents
accruing to the state. Thus, if governments made NOCs the sole operator of upstream
production, they would be able to capture all of the rents from use of the resource (Kemp
1992).
By the 1970s the debate also stemmed from the different discount rates of public and
private actors and their views on depletion policies. With nationalization starting to
occur across the globe, the IOCs high discount rate led them to extract oil as rapidly as
possible. As governments became concerned about running out of oil, they thought that
oil in the ground was worth more than that on the market, and thus, there was a need for
depletion policies to optimize the societal benefit of production (Stevens 2008). All of
these economic and political factors converged to lead to a widespread nationalization of
oil companies across the developing world.
Finally, it is important to note that the transition to public ownership varied across
the Middle Eastern countries. In most cases there was an overlap where the national and
international companies shared operations, as IOCs trained nationals to help countries
establish the technical expertise that they lacked (Marcel 2005). Saudi Aramco provides
the best example of a fluid transition, wherein there was a slow progressive
nationalization while the company used technical marketing agreements with IOCs until
the 1980s. The relatively positive relations between Saudi Arabia and the American oil
companies during private ownership had a lasting impact on how the NOC functions.
The current board of Saudi Aramco even contains two past executives of IOCs (AlMazrouei 2007).
The Iranian national oil company, NIOC, is an example of the extreme opposite of
Saudi Aramco, in that the circumstances leading up to the 1979 revolution produced
hostile relations between the country’s elites and foreign companies. As a result, oil
contracts were universally canceled after the revolution and the ministry of oil took
complete control of oil fields (Marcel 2005). Thus, the path dependent nature of how
NOCs came to exist led each national company to develop its unique style of
management practices, corporate governance structure, the priority of social goals, and
even the revenue-sharing arrangement with their shareholder, the national government.
Despite the variation across these Middle Eastern companies, the inherent tension
between their societal obligations and the production of oil exists within all of the NOCs.
The next section will explore the empirical evidence on how this dual mandate is
executed.
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Drivers of NOC Performance
Evidence on Efficiency
The most important commercial goals for NOC management are the maximization of
revenue and increased efficiency of production. These priorities represent the core
business functions of the company and provide working capital to sustain operations and
deliver returns to the state. In Valerie Marcel’s (2005) interviews with the leaders of five
Middle Eastern NOCs – in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Algeria and Abu Dhabi – there is
clear evidence that the management acts as an epistemic community within the national
polity, promoting the NOC’s interests in achieving greater efficiencies of production. An
epistemic community is typically recognized as a network of professionals with shared
knowledge and experience, and, in this case, characterizes the oil industry. The managers
all emphasized their overwhelming focus on increasing their commercial
competitiveness, and the desire to be compared to the IOCs (Marcel 2005). Moreover, it
is clear from her interviews that the interests of the NOC and the state are inherently
different. The epistemic community that runs the NOC is concerned with their
profitability, exploration and efficiency (although as will be noted later, their actions do
not always work strictly toward these ends). Governments, however, seek NOC
profitability insofar as it supports the social and political goals of the state. That is,
revenue is a means to a political end, not the end goal itself.
Although the managers do indicate a desire to be recognized for operational
excellence – a goal of professionals in any field – Middle Eastern NOCs are not
comparable to a purely commercial entity, despite how much the managers would like to
advance that image. It is widely noted in quantitative studies of national oil companies
that they have lower labor and capital efficiencies than IOCs. For example, Christian
Wolf finds that NOCs on average employ 71 percent more personnel than IOCs with a
comparable asset base, and generate 18 percent less output than their private counterparts
(2008). In his multivariate regression of a large, cross-sectional data set, there is a
significant negative relationship between state ownership and firm performance. Similar
findings are presented by Eller, Medlock, and Hartley (2007), who show that NOCs are
on average 35 to 65 percent less efficient than IOCs as a result of their non-commercial
objectives and subsidization of domestic fuel prices.
There are also important differences in the reserve development and discount rates of
NOCs and IOCs. Victor (2007) finds in his econometric tests of a sample of 90 countries
that NOCs are almost two-thirds worse than the largest IOCs at converting reserves into
production. To be sure, there is substantial variation across Middle Eastern NOCs in
their individual performance. Saudi Aramco is widely seen as having some of the best
management practices and a strong commercial culture (Meyers Jaffe and Elass 2007).
Victor also presents evidence that OPEC NOCs outperform other NOCs on labor and
capital efficiency, and have comparable revenue generation to private producers (2007).
Still, as a group, NOCs are less efficient than IOCs and the quantitative evidence points
to the non-commercial objectives as the primary driver of this divergence. Moreover, an
examination of the qualitative evidence discussed below reveals the fact that Middle
Eastern NOCs embrace these differences, despite their rhetoric of seeking to emulate
IOCs.
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Corporate Culture
Marcel (2005) presents evidence from interviews with top management at five NOCs
that highlights their corporate culture. Even at Saudi Aramco – which is run more like a
private company than any other NOC – management and employees view their corporate
identity as motivated by the preservation of national welfare. All levels of the staff
acknowledge the problem of excess labor capacity, which persists due the stigma against
firing. However, it does not appear that the firm is willing to take the steps necessary to
eradicate the problem. For example, Saudi executives claim to view their company as a
place where a “heart culture” prevails, such that they concern themselves with the welfare
of employees when making business decisions (Marcel 2005, 57). They proudly contrast
this with Western culture, which they see as crude decision-making based on pure profit
and loss calculations (Marcel 2005). Moreover, Marcel highlights that the young
professionals in the company take pride in this approach, and notes the statement of a
young manager: “(We) aren’t heartless. You don’t fire people. Sometimes we think some
people should go, but then we think about their families, the people depending on
them….” (Marcel 2005, 58).
Despite the favorable talk of meritocracy gleaned from the interviews, it seems that
the corporate culture is not suited toward making Middle Eastern NOCs more labor
efficient. That is to say, if excess labor capacity were reduced, the social implications of
greater unemployment would likely provoke widespread unrest and protest. This is also
the probable outcome of increasing the cost of domestic fuel, which the NOCs currently
subsidize. A reduction in the social mission of the Middle Eastern NOCs would
jeopardize a state’s precarious bargain with its people, whereby it sustains livelihoods
through subsidized consumption in exchange for total state control of the polity.
This kind of social unrest in the producer countries would also have consequences
for consuming countries. Uprisings or protests could cause short-term price increases, as
observed in Nigeria when insurgents attack pipelines and cause the prices of crude oil to
spike on international markets. Thus, it could be argued that the implicit social contract
between Middle Eastern governments and their people – and the concomitant
inefficiencies endured by the NOCs – may actually result in greater stability on
international oil markets than would otherwise be the case if the NOCs were freed of
social mandates, causing increased unemployment and social unrest. Of course, this kind
of counterfactual is difficult to prove. Nevertheless, the political and economic stability
created by this social pact should not be underestimated; the alternative scenario, of the
NOC without social responsibilities, could give rise to new political instability in
producing countries with the effect of increased price volatility around the globe.
The State and the NOC: Formal and Informal Interactions in the Middle East
The hierarchical decision-making structure of Middle Eastern NOCs also inhibits
operational efficiency. Managers tend to shirk responsibility in decision-making, insofar
as they frequently pass decisions off to more senior personnel. Moreover, change is
implemented through a cumbersome process of consulting many partners for advice or
dissent (Marcel 2005). There also appears to be a blurring of roles between who sets
strategy and policy over the hydrocarbon sector. Megateli (1980) identified this
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shortcoming in the early years of state ownership. In his study of Iran, Algeria, and
Mexico, he found that NOCs should have a clear purpose that defines their authority over
decision-making, which is distinct from the broad hydrocarbon policy implemented by
ministries at the national level. They need to formulate specific guidelines for
investment, long-term corporate strategy, and monitoring and evaluation of human
resources (Megateli 1980). Of the Middle Eastern NOCs considered, Saudi Aramco and
ADNOC, of Abu Dhabi, have the clearest differentiation of authority between
government and NOC in the sense that NOCs generally determine strategy (day-to-day
operations and goals) and governments or heads of state set policy (usually centered
around volume targets) (Meyers Jaffe and Elass 2007). Marcel (2005) reports Algeria,
Kuwait, and Iran still need to clarify these roles to improve efficiency. There is also
substantial informal dialogue that takes place between NOCs and the oil ministries
(Marcel 2005), and this can contribute to ambiguity regarding who has authority over
particular issue areas. Business models of any company can suffer from inefficiency
when managers do not know whether they must consult shareholders, in this case the
state, or can pursue growth strategies independently.
To be sure, a fluidity and openness to decision-making can sometimes be an
attribute. For example, in the Middle Eastern region the national government or federal
authority sets policy, but there is also a collaborative dialogue with the NOCs on
technical matters, such as the decision to raise production. This is reported to be the case
in Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi (Marcel 2005). Because extreme
volume changes could conceivably damage oil wells, and negatively affect the NOC’s
long-term productive capacity, it is positive that the companies have input on these
decisions since managers generally have more specialized knowledge than government
officials. In fact, Saudi Aramco reports that it has influenced these decisions at times
when executives thought it was unwise to increase production (Marcel 2005).
Nevertheless, the government, supreme council, or head of state of the respective nation
makes the final decision on volume changes and OPEC quotas. As the Saudi Oil
Minister Ali al-Naimi stated, the policies pursued aim to “meet international oil demand
and stabilize markets” (Marcel 2005, 79). Ultimately, the King of Saudi Arabia
commands authority over oil policy (Meyers Jaffe and Elass 2007). Hence, Saudi policy
will be guided by the King’s objectives, which supercede the technical advice of an NOC.
Geopolitical concerns still dominate, and as al-Naimi notes, this is driven by need to
preserve good relations and retain market share in the European and American markets.
Although authority over policy is concentrated with the King, this arrangement has
produced distinct advantages for Saudi Aramco’s management in other areas of the
NOC’s operations. Because the King has mandated that business and political elites are
forbidden from meddling in Aramco’s management, there is significantly less corruption
within day-to-day management. For example, promotions are almost never the result of
political favors (Marcel 2005; Meyers Jaffe and Elass 2007). That corruption is
minimized by the effectiveness of the monarchy contributes significantly to Aramco’s
superior operating efficiency versus that of its peers.
While the NOC must comply with their government’s decision on the price of
subsidized domestic oil, this is not the case for the pricing of crude exports. In fact,
control over export prices has gradually shifted from Mid Eastern oil ministries to the
exclusive domain of the NOCs, and appears to be driven strictly by commercial terms
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and not influenced by politics (Marcel 2005). All of the five NOCs interviewed in
Marcel (2005) seek to set export prices as close to the market price as possible to
maintain consistency with what the market will bear. Therefore, they base prices on
industry publications such as Platts. Of course, the volume decisions taken by OPEC
governments will obviously affect pricing for these NOCs, as increased or decreased
supply will affect the market price per barrel, in turn, impacting NOCs’ pricing decisions.
Nonetheless, the immediate impact of OPEC decisions on prices and revenue may be
limited in the short-term. Middle Eastern NOCs sell most of their crude on term
contracts with the shortest length of about 3 months, and most shun spot market sales due
the perceived speculative nature on these contracts. As such, they attempt to sell only to
end-users on longer term contracts to ensure some degree of price stability and
predictability of the revenues they will remit to the government (Marcel 2005). Thus,
when OPEC increases or decreases production, NOCs are already obligated by existing
contracts for their next few months of sales, thereby reducing OPEC’s effectiveness in
setting or stabilizing prices.
Reinvestment of Capital
Another important factor that will impact the NOCs’ performance – and the ability to
service the growing energy demand of consuming countries – is the capacity to reinvest
profits and develop upstream reserves. This situation is increasingly critical to global
supply as non-OPEC growth rates are projected to slow, and many Middle Eastern NOCs
were producing at or near current capacity during the price upswing from 2003 to 2005
(Marcel 2005; Meyers Jaffe and Elass 2007). However, the opportunity to reinvest
capital and expand operations varies by country. In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu
Dhabi, NOCs report that they generate enough retained earnings to self-finance projects
(Marcel 2005). From the financial disclosures made to Marcel, it appears that Saudi
Aramco has 7 percent of profits after taxes and payments to the government that it can
allocate for capital and operating expenditures. The Kuwaiti after-tax earnings are
estimated at around 10 percent of sales, as the government generally takes between 80
and 90 percent of total revenue. The amount retained by ADNOC is not reported, except
that the company retains an amount for operations and expenditures before taxation
(Marcel 2005). The Algerian and Iranian NOCs, conversely, have had to turn to capital
markets for financing to meet investment needs. When looking at a broader sample of
developing country NOCs, however, there is also evidence that many do not retain
enough revenue to self-finance investment. Stevens (2003) reports that the subsidized
domestic prices covered by NOCs in Latin America and Nigeria leaves the companies
cash-starved without enough investment capital.
Challenges and Opportunities for Middle Eastern NOCs
The current global recession will likely introduce new financial pressure in oildependent economies on the availability of capital for investment in reserve development.
The decrease in global demand has significantly depressed oil prices, which fell for a
sustained time below the $50 per barrel threshold that all Middle Eastern NOCs need to
balance their budgets (and some need much higher prices, signaling their worse fiscal
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position) (Setser and Ziembra 2009). This added budgetary pressure will make it
increasingly likely that governments will garner larger portions of NOC earnings to cover
fiscal needs, thereby decreasing the available pool of capital for reinvestment. Some of
the budgetary needs may be covered by the countries sovereign wealth funds, but the size
of these funds has also contracted as a result of the financial crisis.
In the event that NOCs cannot self-finance investment for development of reserves,
funding would need to be sought through global capital markets, bank financing, or
through foreign direct investment by the IOCs, which would likely take the form of joint
ventures. In Algeria and Iran, where governments already drain NOC earnings for
budgetary needs, these countries borrow on capital markets. But if the cost of capital is
high (like it currently is as a result of the global credit crunch) and the potential rate of
return is relatively low (as it may be for the foreseeable future as a result of the recession
driving down energy demand), external financing may be difficult to get or simply too
expensive to justify development of reserves. Notably, however, this is not only a
problem for NOCs. Many IOC drilling operations have been shut down because low oil
prices do not offer high enough returns for private actors to invest.
As previously discussed, Victor (2007) indicates that NOCs are generally less
efficient than IOCs in converting reserves into output because their business model is not
purely profit-driven. But insofar as the assumed benefit of reserve development is a lower
likelihood of price spikes and greater price stability, it is not clear that the profit-seeking
interests of IOCs will operate in a way that stabilizes world oil markets from boom and
bust cycles. To wit: private actors fail to invest when oil prices are at historic lows
because they would end up with large excess inventories and dead capital. Nonetheless,
many observers expect long-term demand to increase as a result of the growing middle
classes in China and India. Thus, the problem with leaving investment to purely market
forces is that private actors fail to reinvest when prices are low and thereby induce future
price volatility. Moreover, increasing capacity during spikes may not be technically
possible, or may not occur fast enough to alleviate the negative economic impact on
consumer countries.
Because Middle Eastern NOCs are not purely profit seeking, they could pursue this
long-term goal of supply stability and many would not face the same concerns as IOCs
that share price will suffer from high inventories. There is obviously still a cost, which
the government will bear in the form of lower net income from the NOC. But this could
be mitigated through trade incentives offered by rich countries, in exchange for the
producer countries’ implementation of policies that will benefit global price stability in
the long run. Thus, NOCs may have a unique opportunity to stabilize global supply in
the future. Ultimately, this depends on the political will of the producer states, which
could be facilitated by significant economic inducements from rich countries that stand to
suffer from a long-term climb in oil prices.
FDI Joint Ventures
Marcel (2005) reports that the Middle Eastern NOCs in her study have faced
resistance from IOCs in pursuing FDI joint ventures, stemming from the potential for idle
capacity as discussed above. But as many Middle Eastern oil fields mature, the NOCs
will increasingly need the technical advice and know-how possessed by IOCs to be able
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to maximize extraction of reserves. The level of cooperation will depend to some extent
on the quality of the relationships between NOCs and IOCs that were established in the
pre-nationalization period, and the path-dependent evolution of these relationships that
has occurred since that time. As such, the potential for collaboration is the highest in
Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, where communication between the public and private
actors is fluid and ADNOC’s capital structure consists of 40 percent private ownership.
Kuwait and Iran face greater political obstacles to foreign investment. The Kuwaiti
parliament has long been resistant to opening the oil sector to private foreign capital, and
the conservative government in Iran expresses similar sentiments, with the additional
obstacle of U.S. sanctions policy. And beyond the level of political will in host countries,
the quality of the investment and potential return in the respective country will be major
factors in determining whether IOCs will participate.
The Future of the NOCs’ Social Mandates
Extreme price volatility has been an inherent characteristic of oil markets since the
first discoveries in Pennsylvania during the 19th century, and it will remain a challenge
for all market participants. Because NOCs are not purely profit-seeking actors, the price
signals will affect their commercial decisions but will also impact the scope and extent of
their social mandate. In evaluating the impact of the current recession, history can serve
as a guide for how the Middle Eastern NOCs and their governments might respond.
During the price collapse of 1997-98, the NOCs cut back their social spending due to the
lower oil revenues. Since that time, the NOCs have gradually dissolved their former
responsibilities of investing in roads, infrastructure, and social programs, and instead,
currently focus their spending on training and education (Marcel 2005). The difficult
quandary for Middle Eastern governments and their NOCs is that by pursuing an
international policy to further their short-term interests – that is, to work with OPEC to
cut production, raise the price, and capture more revenue – they would inherently harm
their long-term revenue position. Price increases would likely have the effect of
prolonging and even deepening the recession in the U.S. and Europe by raising
companies input costs at a time when output is contracting or stagnant.
Thus, if prices remain relatively low over the medium term there will be inevitable
pressure for Middle Eastern NOCs to cut operating costs. This could be most effectively
achieved by reducing excess or inefficient labor. But to take such action would mean that
the NOCs aggravate already high unemployment levels in the Middle East, and such
action may be unpalatable to governments.
These macroeconomic challenges and their policy trade-offs are exacerbated by the
demographic challenges of the Middle Eastern region. Colloquially referred to as the
‘youth bulge,’ the proportion of the region’s population under twenty years of age
averages about 38 percent, ranging from a high in Saudi Arabia at 50 percent of the
population and a low in the United Arab Emirates of 26 percent (U.S. Census Bureau
International Database 2009). The magnitude of the demographic challenge does not
apply equally to all Middle East oil producers, with areas such as Abu Dhabi and Kuwait
having small populations relative to the large size of their sovereign wealth funds. The
size of the youth population raises the question of whether these economies will have
sufficient employment opportunities for their growing labor pools.
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Despite the fact that education rates have generally improved, the capital-intensive
oil sector cannot support all of the new entrants to the labor force. The hydrocarbon
sector provides jobs for only 1 to 2 percent of the total workforce in most Middle Eastern
countries (Mitchell 2005). This is a serious long-term threat to political and economic
stability if governments cannot create jobs to support a restive youth population. In
economies that are overwhelmingly dependent on hydrocarbons, the dearth of other
employment opportunities could give rise to increased social unrest in these
predominantly autocratic regimes. Moreover, the increased unemployment may serve as
a new impetus for the governments to push the burden of adjustment onto NOCs by
forcing them to absorb the excess labor. Alternatively, labor levels could remain constant
at NOCs, while the states take a greater portion of its revenues to train workers and
develop the non-oil sector of the economy. Both policy options, however, have the
potential to reduce the amount of capital available for reinvestment in reserves, which
increases the potential for price spikes on international markets if supply does not grow
fast enough to keep pace with demand.
Conclusion
National Oil Companies of the Middle East are unique from private firms because
their public ownership requires that they seek to develop both the country’s hydrocarbon
sector and support economic development of the country. Most commonly, this takes the
form of subsidizing the domestic price of energy, employing more labor than might be
economically optimal, and other forms of social spending on education. The empirical
evidence across many countries reveals that these priorities result in NOCs lower capital
and labor efficiency than their private counterparts.
An examination of the corporate culture and management practices, however, shows
that the dual mandate is a deeply entrenched part of the Middle Eastern NOC’s identity.
While management attests to promoting efficiency and greater profitability, there is still a
prevailing obligation to national welfare that drives decision-making. Because of the
historical evolution of NOCs, and the national pride they evoke in the developing
countries, it seems unlikely that these attitudes will be altered dramatically in the near
future. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are reasonable changes that could be
implemented to improve operating efficiency. The Middle Eastern case studies show that
where there are clear lines of authority over decision-making between the state and the
NOC, management is more efficient. Moreover, strong leadership by the state can
prevent political patronage from interfering with the NOC operations, as in the case of
Saudi Aramco.
NOCs face serious challenges in light of the global recession and drop in energy
demand. Most important to the long-term energy security of consuming nations is the
ability of Middle Eastern NOCs to reinvest capital to develop reserves. While the largest
NOCs claim to retain enough revenue for investment expenditures, this could change in
an era of low oil demand and profits. The producer governments will likely want to keep
as much of the NOC revenue as possible to cover budget shortfalls, thereby jeopardizing
the available capital for reinvestment. Consumer nations should offer inducements for
these countries to maintain or expand their investment in reserve development so that
NOCs can continue to grow supply in a way that meets the burgeoning future energy
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demand of emerging economies. Trade preferences are one such inducement that would
offer substantial benefits to these countries, thereby helping them to diversify the
economies while also ensuring stable growth of energy supply.
The Middle Eastern producers face external challenges from low oil prices, and
internal challenges from the changing demographics of the labor force. The extent to
which producer and consumer nations can work together to solve these problems, and
promote relative price stability over the long-term, will have an important impact on the
pace of future global economic growth in both rich and poor countries.
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